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Reputational Economies of Scale 
Daniel Klerman 
Miguel F. P. de Figueiredo* 
 
Abstract 
For many years, most scholars have assumed that the strength of reputational 
incentives is positively correlated with the frequency of repeat play. Firms that sell 
more products or services were thought more likely to be trustworthy than those that 
sell less because they have more to lose if consumers decide they have behaved badly. 
That assumption has been called into question by recent work that shows that, under 
the standard infinitely repeated game model of reputation, reputational economies of 
scale will occur only under special conditions, such as monopoly, because larger firms 
not only have more to lose from behaving badly, but also more to gain. This article 
argues that reputational economies of scale exist even when there is competition and 
without other special conditions, if the probability of detection is positively correlated 
with the frequency of repeat play. It also shows that reputational economies of scale 
exist in a finite horizon model of reputation. Reputational economies of scale help 
explain why law and accounting firms can act as gatekeepers, why mass market 
products are more likely to be safe, why firms are less likely to exploit one-sided 
contracts than consumers, and why manufacturers market new products under the 
umbrella of established trademarks. 
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1. Introduction 
 For many years, most scholars have assumed that the strength of reputational incentives 
is positively correlated with the frequency of repeat play. The conventional wisdom was that 
firms that sell more products or services are more likely to be trustworthy than those that sell 
less, because they have more to lose if consumers decide they have behaved badly. This 
assumption helps explain why law and accounting firms can act as gatekeepers, why mass 
market products are more likely to be safe, why firms are less likely to exploit one-sided 
contracts than consumers, and why manufacturers market new products under the umbrella of 
established trademarks (Kraakman 1984 p. 891, Coffee 2006 p. 136, S. Choi 1998, Barnett 2012, 
Polinsky & Shavell 2010 p. 1491, Bebchuk & Posner 2006 p. 832, but see Macey 2013 Chapters 
6 and 7).  
Nevertheless, articles by Eric Rasmusen (2016) and Edward Iacobucci (2012) call into 
question the assumption of reputational economies of scale. They assert that, under the infinitely 
repeated game model of reputational enforcement, there is no advantage to firms that sell 
products with greater frequency. While firms that sell more have more to lose if they misbehave, 
they also have more to gain from misbehaving, and these two effects offset each other precisely.  
Instead, Rasmusen and Iacobucci assert that there are reputational economies of scale only under 
special circumstances, such as monopoly. Rasmusen and Iacobucci’s work is consistent with 
prior work that shows reputational economies, because those articles assume an infinite horizon 
model in which sellers are able to price monopolistically (Rob & Fishman 2005, Cai & Obara 
2009, J. Choi 1998, Wernerfelt, 1988).1   
This article argues that reputational economies of scale exist under the infinitely repeated 
game model of reputation, even when there is competition and without other special conditions.  
The infinitely repeated game reputation model requires only minor adjustment in order to 
generate reputational economies of scale. The only modification necessary is to assume that low 
quality is detected with probability less than one and that the probability of detection is 
positively correlated with the frequency of repeat play. This assumption is valid for nearly all 
situations to which reputational enforcement is usually applied. For example, if a manufacturer 
skimps on the safety of its products, the probability that any one product will cause an accident is 
likely to be less than one. Nevertheless, if the manufacturer sells many products, it is quite likely 
that there will be accidents. As it sells more low-quality products, there will be more accidents 
and more bad publicity, and consumers are more likely to choose to buy other products. 
                                                 
1 Rogerson (1983) shows that higher quality firms tend to have more customers in a model with 
competition, although he assumes that firms “make a once-and-for-all quality choice upon entering the 
market” and therefore do not face that moral hazard problem (temptation to shirk on quality) that 
characterizes most of the literature.  Helpful surveys on reputation include Bar-Isaac & Tadelis 2008, 
MacLeod 2007, Mailath & Samuelson 2006.   
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Similarly, if an accounting firm is not rigorous in an audit of a single company in a single year, 
the probability that its lack of rigor will become known is less than one. Nevertheless, if an 
accounting firm is consistently sloppy in its audits of many companies, the low quality of its 
audits will eventually damage its reputation. 
Rasmusen and Iacobucci’s argument against reputational economies of scale applies with 
equal force to finite horizon models of reputation, such as that developed by Kreps and Wilson 
(1982) and Milgrom and Roberts (1982). In fact, even with monopoly, there are no reputational 
economies of scale in simple finite horizon models. Nevertheless, the same modification – that 
the probability of detection is positively correlated with the frequency of repeat play – is also 
sufficient to generate reputational economies of scale in a finite horizon model of reputation.  
 Section 2 briefly sets out the point made by Rasmusen and Iacobucci that, under the basic 
infinitely repeated game model of reputation, there are no reputational economies of scale. 
Section 3 modifies the basic model by assuming that the probability of detection is less than one. 
It shows that the minimum quality-assuring price decreases with the volume of sales. Section 4 
extends the analysis to the situation where firms are of different sizes. Because the quality-
assuring price is lower for larger firms, firms which sell more will force smaller competitors out 
of the market. Section 5 analyzes the umbrella branding context and shows that a trademark 
owner can leverage its trademark from one competitive market to another and that doing so may 
make the market for high quality viable. Section 6 analyzes reputational economies of scale 
under a finite horizon model with two types.  Section 7 discusses caveats and extensions, and 
Section 8 concludes. 
2. Lack of Economies of Scale in the Basic Model 
This section generally follows Rasmusen’s 1989 and 2007 formalization of Klein and 
Leffler’s 1981 article. There are an infinite number of potential firms and consumers. In each 
period, there are 𝑛 firms that participate in the market by selling at least one unit of the relevant 
good. Each participating firm incurs a fixed cost, 𝐹 > 0, which is paid at the beginning of the 
first period in which it participates. A firm that chooses not to participate gets payoff of zero. 
Each period, each firm can choose to make products of high or low quality. Quality cannot be 
observed by consumers at the time of purchase. It costs a firm 𝑐 > 0, paid at the end of the 
relevant period, to produce a unit of the high quality good; it costs zero to produce the low 
quality good. Each period, each firm chooses its price p. Each period, consumers decide how 
much of the product to buy from each firm. The amount consumers buy in each period from firm 
i is denoted qi, and firms receive the payment at the end of the period. After purchasing the good, 
consumers learn the quality of the goods they purchased and can use that knowledge to 
determine which firm to purchase from in the next period. Knowledge is shared among all 
consumers. The payoff to a consumer of buying a low-quality product is zero. The payoff to 
buying a high quality product varies among consumers, but for every price, there are a sufficient 
number of consumers willing to pay it to support several competing firms, although, of course, 
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total demand, 𝑞(𝑝) = ∑ 𝑞𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1 > 0, falls with price, 
𝑑𝑞
𝑑𝑝
< 0, where total demand is a 
differentiable and thus continuous function of price. The discount rate is 𝑟 > 0.  The game 
repeats infinitely. Since this is an infinitely repeated game, there are many equilibria. The 
equilibria of interest, however, are those that sustain the production of high-quality goods. The 
exposition below is confined to ascertaining the conditions for such equilibria. 
Consider a firm that is deciding between two alternatives: (1) producing high quality 
products in every period and receiving a high price, and (2) producing low quality in every 
period, getting the high price in the first period and then zero profits in every other period. 𝑝∗ is 
the price at which a firm would be indifferent between these two alternatives: 
 
𝑞𝑖(𝑝
∗−𝑐)
𝑟
=
𝑞𝑖𝑝
∗
1+𝑟
        (1) 
A little algebra shows that: 
 𝑝∗ = (1 + 𝑟)𝑐        (2) 
This 𝑝∗ is the quality-assuring price. It is the minimum price that gives a firm an incentive to 
produce high quality goods. Note that the quality-assuring price does not vary with the quantity 
produced by each firm, 𝑞𝑖.  
It is a perfect equilibrium (a) for consumers to purchase randomly in the first period from 
firms selling at 𝑝∗, but, after that, to purchase randomly only from firms that sell at 𝑝∗ and that 
have never sold a low quality product, and (b) for firms to produce high quality and sell at 𝑝∗. 
To make this price consistent with free entry, the profit for each firm must be zero. That is,  
  
𝐹 =
𝑞𝑖(𝑝
∗−𝑐)
𝑟
       (3) 
Substituting (2), 𝑝∗ = (1 + 𝑟)𝑐, we can derive the equilibrium quantity produced by each firm, 
𝑞𝑖
∗ 
𝑞𝑖
∗ =
𝐹
𝑐
       (4) 
The equilibrium number of firms, 𝑛∗, entering the market in each period is derived by setting 
supply equal to demand: 
𝑛∗𝑞𝑖
∗ = 𝑞(𝑝∗)       (5) 
Combining (3), (4) and (5): 
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𝑛∗ =
𝑐𝑞(𝑝∗)
𝐹
=
𝑐𝑞((1+𝑟)𝑐)
𝐹
     (6) 
where 𝑞((1 + 𝑟)𝑐) denotes 𝑞, total quantity, as a function of (1 + 𝑟)𝑐, not 𝑞 times (1 + 𝑟)𝑐. The 
most important point is that the equilibrium price in equation (2) does not vary with quantity.  
Suppose, for example, that a firm were somehow able to double its quantity from 𝑞𝑖  to 2𝑞𝑖. The 
quality-assuring price would still be given by the price that makes the firm indifferent between 
high quality and low quality. Modifying equation (1) to take into account the doubling of the 
quantity: 
 
2𝑞𝑖(𝑝
∗−𝑐)
𝑟
=
2𝑞𝑖𝑝
∗
1+𝑟
       (7) 
Doubling the quantity both doubles the benefit of faithfully producing high quality – the left- 
hand side of equation (7) – and doubles the benefit of producing low quality – the right-hand side 
of equation (7). As a result, increasing quantity has no effect – the 2s cancel each other out. So 
equation (7) easily reduces to equation (1), and the quality-assuring price in (2) remains the same 
regardless of the quantity produced by each firm. This is the essence of the argument made by 
Iacobucci (2012 p. 310). In slightly more complicated form, it is the argument made by 
Rasmusen (2016 pp. 267-78). 
3. Reputational Economies of Scale When Low Quality Is Detected With Probability Less 
Than One 
A key assumption in the prior section was that consumers detect and punish low quality with 
probability one at the end of each period. That is obviously unrealistic.  It is more reasonable to 
assume that consumers detect and punish low quality with probability less than one, but that the 
probability increases as the firm sells more low-quality goods.  That is, let 𝑠(𝑘𝑖) be the 
probability that consumers detect and punish low quality if 𝑘𝑖 low quality units are produced, 
where 0 ≤ 𝑘𝑖 ≤ 𝑞𝑖, 𝑠(0) = 0 , lim
𝑘𝑖→∞
𝑠(𝑘𝑖) = 1, 𝑠′ > 0, and 𝑠
′′ < 0.  The assumption that the 
second derivative is negative follows largely (but not entirely) from the idea that 𝑠(𝑘𝑖) is 
increasing but must take values between zero and one, whereas 𝑘𝑖 can be any positive real 
number.   That means that the second derivative would need to be negative over most of its range 
(although it could be zero or positive over some intervals). It simplifies the math to assume that 
the second derivative is always negative. The probability of detection and punishment might 
increase because media are more likely to publicize defects in products that are widely 
distributed.2 Another possible mechanism would be to assume that the probability with which the 
low quality of any particular unit purchased is detected is 𝜌 , 0 < 𝜌 < 0 and independent. One 
could then interpret 𝑠 to be the probability that low quality is detected in at least one unit 
                                                 
2 Large firms may, however, may be better able to manipulate the media or mitigate the effects of 
negative publicity through their own advertising and public relations. The author thanks Joshua 
Teitelbaum for this insight.  
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produced by a firm in a given period, under the assumption that consumers will punish the firm if 
it produces any low quality. Under this interpretation, if 𝑘𝑖 low quality units are sold, 𝑠 = 1 −
(1 − 𝜌)𝑘𝑖. Another interpretation might be that 𝑠(𝑘𝑖) is the fraction of consumers who refuse to 
buy from the firm that has sold low quality. That probability might go up with the number of low 
quality units produced, because knowledge of low quality is more likely to diffuse, either 
through word of mouth or through media, when the number of defective products is larger. 
Assume provisionally that the firm produces either all high quality or all low quality, that is 
𝑘𝑖 ∈ {0, 𝑞𝑖}. Appendix B shows that this assumption is justified, because it would not be rational 
for a firm to produce some high and some low quality.3 Because the probability of detection, 𝑠, 
increases with quantity of low quality goods, the equation for the quality-assuring price – see (1) 
above – needs to be modified to take into account that cheating is discovered with probability 
less than one. Let 𝑝′∗ denote the quality-assuring price under the assumptions in this section (e.g. 
that the probability of detection is less than one). The payoff of consistently producing high 
quality remains the same, but the payoff to producing low quality is more complicated, because a 
firm producing low quality goods may now get the high payoff for several periods until the low 
quality of its products is detected.  As before, the quality-assuring price, 𝑝′∗, is determined by 
setting the payoff for producing high quality in every period equal to the payoff for producing 
low quality in every period, getting the high price in the first period or periods and then zero 
profits in every other period:  
 
 
𝑞𝑖(𝑝′
∗−𝑐)
𝑟
=
𝑞𝑖𝑝′
∗
1+𝑟
+ (1 − 𝑆)
𝑞𝑖𝑝′
∗
(1+𝑟)2
 +(1 − 𝑠)2
𝑞𝑖𝑝′
∗
(1+𝑟)3
+ ⋯  (7) 
 
= ∑(1 − 𝑠)
𝑗−1 𝑞𝑖𝑝′
∗
(1 + 𝑟)
𝑗
∞
𝑗=1
 
=
𝑞𝑖𝑝′
∗
(1 + 𝑟)
∑ (
1 − 𝑠
1 + 𝑟
)
𝑗∞
𝑗=0
 
                                                 
3 Although the literature often assumes that firms are constrained to offering either all high-
quality or all low-quality, it is useful to check that the quality assuring price does not give firms an 
incentive to produce some high quality and some low-quality product. After all, this and most other 
models in the literature assume fixed marginal cost, so there is no loss in economies of scale if a firm 
chose to produce some high quality and some low quality. Appendix B proves that, under the quality 
assuring price in Equation (8), a firm rationally produces all high quality rather than a mixture of 
qualities. This result could also by justified if one assumed that producing the fixed cost, F, was incurred 
for each quality, e.g. if each quality required a different factory and/or separate management structure.   
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=
𝑞𝑖𝑝
′∗
(1 + 𝑟)
(
1
1 − (1 − 𝑠1 + 𝑟)
) 
=
𝑞𝑖𝑝′
∗
𝑟+𝑠
 
Solving for the quality-assuring price, 𝑝′∗: 
𝑝′∗ =
(𝑟+𝑠)𝑐
𝑠
        (8)  
As one would expect, as the probability of detection, 𝑠, goes to one, 𝑝′∗ in (8) converges to 𝑝∗ in 
(2). Note, however, that since 𝑠 is a function of quantity, the quality-assuring price now varies 
with the quantity produced by each firm, 𝑞𝑖.  In particular, as 𝑞𝑖 approaches infinity, 𝑠 
approaches one, and price approaches (1 + 𝑟)𝑐. On the other hand, as 𝑞𝑖 approaches zero, 𝑠 
approaches 0, and 𝑝′∗ approaches infinity. It is relatively easy to see that 𝑝′∗ is a strictly 
monotonically decreasing function of 𝑞𝑖 . This makes intuitive sense. When quantity is low, the 
probability of detection is low, so the firm needs a high price to make it worthwhile not to cheat. 
This is closely related to the standard result in the economic analysis of crime, where optimal 
sanctions increase as the probability of detection goes down. In the reputation model, the 
“sanction” for cheating is loss of the rents produced by receiving the high price in every period. 
On the other hand, as the probability of detection increases, the firm finds it profitable to produce 
high quality even if the price is lower.  
This is the key result of the paper. Since the quality-assuring price for a firm goes down 
as the firm produces higher quantities, the larger firm has an advantage. It can sell at a lower 
price and still have an incentive to produce high quality. This is the meaning of reputational 
economies of scale.  
As with the basic model, there are many equilibria, but the equilibrium of interest is the 
one which sustains the production of high-quality goods.  It is a perfect equilibrium (a) for 
consumers to purchase randomly in the first period from firms that sell at 𝑝′∗, but, after that, to 
purchase randomly only from firms that sell at 𝑝′∗ and that have never been detecting as selling a 
low-quality product, and (b) for firms to produce high quality and sell at 𝑝′∗. To make this price 
consistent with free entry, the profit for each firm must be zero. That is, the present discounted 
value of rents must equal the fixed cost of entry. 
  
𝐹 =
𝑞𝑖(𝑝′
∗−𝑐)
𝑟
       (9) 
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Substituting 𝑝′∗ =
(𝑟+𝑠)𝑐
𝑠
, we can derive the equilibrium quantity, 𝑞𝑖
′∗ 
𝑞𝑖
′∗
𝑠
=
𝐹
𝑐
  (10)      
Again, it is instructive to compare equation (10) with equation (4), the equivalent 
expression when the probability of detection equals one. As one would expect, as the probability 
that that low quality is detected, 𝑠, approaches one, equation (10) converges to equation (4). 
When 𝑞𝑖
′∗ = 1, the left-hand side of equation (10) is 
1
𝑠(1)
. As 𝑞𝑖
′∗
 increases from one, the left-hand 
side approaches infinity. This means that, as long as 
𝐹
𝑐
≥
1
𝑠(1)
 , there exists a quantity, 𝑞𝑖
′∗, such 
that equation (10) is satisfied, because 𝑠(𝑞) is differentiable and thus continuous.4 The condition, 
 
𝐹
𝑐
≥
1
𝑠(1)
, means that there may not be an equilibrium quantity with zero profits in situations 
where fixed costs are very low in relation to the variable costs of producing high quality and/or 
the probability of detection is very low. In those situations, the quality assuring price needs to be 
so high that, even if a firm produced only a single unit, it would earn positive profits.  
 Given that 𝑞𝑖
′∗ exists, it is trivial to find the equilibrium number of firms, 𝑛′∗, by finding 
the value that satisfies: 
 𝑛′∗𝑞𝑖
′∗ = 𝑞(𝑝)       (11) 
𝑛′∗ =
𝑞(𝑝′
∗
)
𝑞𝑖
′∗         (12) 
 It should be noted that the equilibrium described in this section is informationally 
demanding. Both consumers and producers need to know the quality-assuring price, and this 
requires that both consumers and producers know the cost of producing high quality goods, 
producers’ fixed costs, and the probability that low quality will be detected. The need for the first 
piece of information is a characteristic of the basic infinitely repeated game model of reputation. 
The need for information on fixed costs and the probability that low quality is detected is, 
however, an additional requirement of the modified model presented in this section. Rasmusen 
and Perri (2001) suggest, using a more complicated model, that it might be possible to relax 
some of these informational requirements. Further research could explore the extent to which the 
results in this section are robust to parties estimating the parameters with error. In the real world, 
consumers do seem to have some sense that certain low prices are “too good to be true.” This 
                                                 
4 Depending on the exact form of the function 𝑠(𝑘), here may be more than one quantity, 𝑞𝑖
′∗, that 
satisfies equation (10).  If so, let 𝑞𝑖
′∗ be the highest such value.  It is also possible that equation (10) will 
be satisfied for some values  
𝐹
𝑐
<
1
𝑠(1)
. 
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suggests that the model’s prediction that consumers would refuse to buy from producers who 
charged too low a price has some plausibility.   
4. Different Sized Firms 
 In the model in the prior section, firm size (the quantity sold by each firm) was 
endogenous, and, in equilibrium, all firms were of the same size. Suppose, however, some firms 
are able to sell more than others. For example, perhaps, in addition to individual consumers there 
are a few bulk corporate or governmental buyers who buy on long-term contracts.5 Even if the 
bulk buyers chose from whom to purchase randomly, those firms would acquire a price 
advantage, because, as noted in the prior section, the quality-assuring price falls with quantity. 
The larger firms with the bulk contracts would underprice the other firms in the individual 
market and force the smaller firms out of the market. Similar size differences could emerge if 
individual consumers were influenced to prefer the products of some firms over others, perhaps 
through advertising, favorable press, or other factors. 
5. Umbrella Branding 
 Now consider what would happen if some firms sell multiple goods while other sell only 
one good. For simplicity, suppose there are two goods, A and B, and three types of firms, firms 
that produce only A, firms that produce only B, and firms that produce both A and B. This 
section will show that firms that produce both A and B will be able to sell both A and B at lower 
prices than firms that produce only A or only B. As a result, firms which produce only A or B 
will not survive in equilibrium, and only those that produce both A and B will survive. This 
establishes the core idea of reputational economies of scale – larger firms which sell more 
products have a competitive advantage over smaller ones. The intuition for this result is the same 
as for the result in the previous section. The firm that sells both goods sells more total goods, so, 
because the quality assuring price falls with quantity, the firm selling both goods will be able to 
sell at a lower cost and drive single-good firms out of the market. Nevertheless, the math 
demonstrating this result gets rather complicated, because one must take into account the price, 
quantity, and number of firms in two different markets. 
The analysis in this section depends crucially on how consumers react to the detection of 
low quality in one product produced by a firm that produces multiple products. If a consumer 
purchases product A and it turns out to be of low quality, the consumer might cease purchasing 
product A from that firm, but still purchase product B from it. Or, such a consumer might shun 
all products from that firm, that is, avoid purchasing both A and B from it. If consumers behave 
in the former way – treating low quality in one product as irrelevant to the quality of other 
products produced by the same firm – then there is no advantage to the two-product firm, and the 
equilibrium with different sized firms is the same as if firms were all the same size. On the other 
                                                 
5 To preserve the incentive to produce high quality goods, these contracts would need to give the 
bulk buyers the right to cancel the contract without penalty if any buyer detected low quality. 
10 
 
hand, if, as seem plausible, consumers interpret low quality in one product to mean that the firm 
is cutting corners on both products, then it makes sense for them to refuse to purchase A or B 
from that firm.  If so, a new and interesting equilibrium arises. That is the equilibrium that will 
be analyzed in the rest of this section. This equilibrium is plausible in situations where a 
producer has chosen to market two or more products under the same trademark – for example, 
several different car models under the trademark “Toyota” or several types of toothpaste under 
the trademark “Colgate.” In these situations, it is plausible that consumers assume that quality 
standards are similar for all products marketed under the same “umbrella trademark.” 
Notation needs to be modified to reflect that there are now two different goods. Denote 
the quantity of good A produced by firm 𝑖 as 𝑞𝐴𝑖, the quantity of good B produced by such a firm 
is  𝑞𝐵𝑖, and denote the cost of producing high quality of each good as 𝑐𝐴 > 0, and 𝑐𝐵 > 0. Let 
𝑠𝐴(𝑘𝐴𝑖) be the probability that low quality is detected and punished if the firm sells 𝑘𝐴𝑖 low 
quality units of product A, but either no product B or only high quality of product B.  Let 
𝑠𝐵(𝑘𝐵𝑖) be the probability that low quality is detected and punished, if the firm sells 𝑘𝐵𝑖 low 
quality units of product B, but either no product A or only high quality of product A.  Let 
𝑠𝐴𝐵(𝑘𝐴𝑖 , 𝑘𝐵𝑖) be the probability that low quality is detected and punished, if the firm sells 
𝑘𝐴𝑖  low-quality units of A and 𝑘𝐵𝑖  low quality units of B.  0 ≤ 𝑘𝐴𝑖 ≤ 𝑞𝐴𝑖 and 0 ≤ 𝑘𝐵𝑖 ≤ 𝑞𝐵𝑖.  As 
with the one good case, assume 𝑠𝑢(0) = 0 , lim
𝑘𝑢𝑖→∞
𝑠𝑢(𝑘𝑢𝑖) = 1, 𝑠𝑢
′ > 0, and 𝑠𝑢
′′ < 0, where 𝑢 ∈
{𝐴, 𝐵}.  Similarly, 𝑠𝐴𝐵(0,0) = 0, 𝑠𝐴𝐵(0, 𝑘𝐵𝑖) = 𝑠𝐵(𝑘𝐵𝑖), 𝑠𝐴𝐵(𝑘𝐴𝑖 , 0) = 𝑠𝐴(𝑘𝐴𝑖),  
lim
𝑘𝐴𝑖+𝑘𝐵𝑖→∞
𝑠𝐴𝐵(𝑘𝐴𝑖 , 𝑘𝐵𝑖) = 1, 
𝑑𝑠𝐴𝐵
𝑑𝑘𝑢𝑖
> 0 and 
𝑑2𝑠𝐴𝐵
𝑑2𝑘𝑢𝑖
> 0.  Note that these assumptions imply that if 
the firm produces positive quantities of both low quality A and B,  𝑠𝐴𝐵 > 𝑠𝐴  and 𝑠𝐴𝐵 > 𝑠𝐵. This 
makes sense, because if two firms produce the same number of low quality goods of kind A, and 
one of them also produces low-quality goods of kind B, it is more likely that the firm that 
produces two types of low-quality goods will be caught. After all, the probability that the two-
good firm is caught making low-quality goods of kind A is the same as the probability that the 
one good firm is caught making low quality goods of kind A, but the two-good firm also has 
some probability of being caught making low quality goods of kind B. Under the interpretation 
that the probability with which the low quality of any particular unit purchased of good A or B is 
detected as 𝜌𝐴 > 0 and 𝜌𝐵 > 0, where these two probabilities are independent, then 𝑠𝐴 = 1 −
(1 − 𝜌𝐴)
𝑘𝐴𝑖 , 𝑠𝐵 = 1 − (1 − 𝜌𝐵)
𝑘𝐵𝑖 , and 𝑠𝐴𝐵 = 𝑠𝐴 + 𝑠𝐵−𝑠𝐴𝑠𝐵 =  1 − (1 − 𝜌𝐴)
𝑘𝐴𝑖 (1 − 𝜌𝐵)
𝑘𝐵𝑖 .  
Note that, under this interpretation, the assumptions made above, that 𝑠𝐴𝐵 > 𝑠𝐴  and 𝑠𝐴𝐵 > 𝑠𝐵, 
are always true when the firm produces both low goods of both goods (e.g. 𝑘𝐴𝑖 > 0 and 𝑘𝐵𝑖 > 0)   
Let 𝐹𝐴 > 0, and 𝐹𝐵 > 0 be the fixed costs of producing A and B respectively. As in the one-good 
case, these costs are paid at the beginning of the first period in which the firm produces the 
relevant good.  Note that 𝐹𝐴 does not depend on whether the firm produces one or two goods, nor 
does 𝐹𝐵.  That is, there are no economies of scope attributable to the fixed costs.  This 
assumption, like the assumption of constant marginal costs, allows the analysis to focus 
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economies scale created by reputation rather than by technological factors. As in the one good 
case, the payoff to buying high quality of product A or B varies among consumers, but for every 
price and each good, there are a sufficient number of consumers willing to pay it to support 
several competing firms, although, of course, total demand, 𝑞𝐴(𝑝) = ∑ 𝑞𝐴𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1 > 0 and 𝑞𝐵(𝑝) =
∑ 𝑞𝐵𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1 > 0, falls with price, 
𝑑𝑞𝐴
𝑑𝑝
< 0 and 
𝑑𝑞𝐵
𝑑𝑝
< 0, where total demand for A and B is a 
differentiable and thus continuous function of the price of each good. 
As in the previous section, assume provisionally that the firm does not mix high and low 
quality for a given product.  That is, if the firm produces A, all units of A are high quality or all 
or low quality.  Similarly, if the firm produces B, all units of B are high quality or all are low 
quality.  Appendix B shows that this assumption is justified, because it would not be rational for 
a firm to produce some high and some low quality of each product.  
The goal of this section is to find quality assuring prices for the two good firm which are 
lower than those for the single good firm and consistent with competition.  For this to be true, the 
following six conditions (C1-C6) must be satisfied.  
C1. High quality on both A and B at least as profitable as low quality on both A and B: 
𝑞𝐴𝑖(𝑝𝐴
′∗−𝑐𝐴)+𝑞𝐵𝑖(𝑝𝐵
′∗−𝑐𝐵)
𝑟
≥ 
𝑞𝐴𝑖𝑝𝐴
′∗+𝑞𝐵𝑖𝑝𝐵
′∗
(𝑟+𝑠𝐴𝐵)
  
C2. High quality on both A and B at least as profitable as high quality on B and low 
quality on A: 
𝑞𝐴𝑖(𝑝𝐴
′∗−𝑐𝐴)+𝑞𝐵𝑖(𝑝𝐵
′∗−𝑐𝐵)
𝑟
≥ 
𝑞𝐴𝑖𝑝𝐴
′∗+𝑞𝐵𝑖(𝑝𝐵
′∗−𝑐𝐵)
(𝑟+𝑠𝐴)
 
C3. High quality on both A and B at least as profitable as high quality on A and low 
quality on B: 
𝑞𝐴𝑖(𝑝𝐴
′∗−𝑐𝐴)+𝑞𝐵𝑖(𝑝𝐵
′∗−𝑐𝐵)
𝑟
≥ 
𝑞𝐴𝑖(𝑝𝐴
′∗−𝑐𝐴)+𝑞𝐵𝑖𝑝𝐵
′∗
(𝑟+𝑠𝐵)
  
C4. Prices are lower for a firm producing both A and B than for a firm selling only A or 
only B (assuming equal quantities): 
 𝑝𝐴
′∗ <
(𝑟+𝑠𝐴)𝑐𝐴
𝑠𝐴
    and   𝑝𝐵
′∗ <
(𝑟+𝑠𝐵)𝑐𝐵
𝑠𝐵
         
C5. Competition drives down prices to the lowest values consistent with C1-C3: 
 Either C1 or C2 or C3 holds with equality 
C6. New firms enter the market until profits drop to zero: 
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 𝐹𝐴 + 𝐹𝐵 =  
𝑞𝐴𝑖
(𝑝𝐴
′∗−𝑐𝐴)+𝑞𝐵𝑖
(𝑝𝐵
′∗−𝑐𝐵)
𝑟   
 
The existence of an ordered pair, (𝑝𝐴′∗, 𝑝𝐵′∗), that satisfies these constraints is proved in 
Appendix A.  
Note that if the quantity of A produced by the A-only firm and by the firm producing 
both A and B are equal, then the quality-assuring price will be lower for the firm producing both 
A and B than for the firm producing only A. This price advantage directly follows from the 
discussion in Section III of expression (8) where it was shown that the quality-assuring price for 
a firm goes down as the firm produces higher quantities. Here, the firm produces both A and B, 
and thus produces at higher overall quantities than the firm that produces only A. Similarly, the 
quality-assuring price for the two-product firm will be lower than for a firm producing only good 
B. From the two-product firm’s price advantage, it is easy to see that the two-product firm will 
dominate the market for both A and B. Consider the following set of strategies that form a 
perfect equilibrium.   
Let 𝑝𝐴
′∗ and  𝑝𝐵
′∗  be the pair of prices identified in Appendix A as satisfying constraints 
C1-C6. 
 
(1) Consumers purchase good A randomly in the first period from firms that sell both A 
and B and that sell good A at 𝑝𝐴
′∗. After the first period, consumers purchase good A 
randomly from firms that sell both A and B and that sell good A at 𝑝𝐴
′∗and that have never 
been detected as having sold a low-quality product.  
 
(2) Consumers purchase good B randomly in the first period from firms that sell both A 
and B and that sell good B at 𝑝𝐵
′∗. After the first period, consumers purchase good B 
randomly from firms that sell both A and B and that sell good B at 𝑝𝐵
′∗and which have 
never been detected as having sold a low quality product. 
 
(3) Firms that produce both A and B produce both at high quality and sell them at prices 
𝑝𝐴
′∗ and at 𝑝𝐵
′∗ respectively. 
 
(4) Firms that would produce only A or only B never enter the market. 
Note that it is rational for consumers to purchase only from firms which sell both A and 
B, because a firm that produced only A or only B would not rationally produce high-quality 
goods at 𝑝𝐴
′∗ or 𝑝𝐵
′∗. For example, if a firm that produced only good A sold its goods at 𝑝𝐴
′∗, it 
would have no incentive to produce high quality, because, as pointed out above, 𝑝𝐴
′∗ is lower 
than the quality-assuring price for the A-only firm. So it would produce low quality. So no 
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rational consumer would purchase from it at that price. Since consumers won’t purchase from a 
firm that produced only good A or good B, such firms rationally will not pay the fixed cost to 
enter the market. 
 Note, of course, that there are many equilibria, including equilibria in which both two-
product and single-product produce goods of similar quality. The most obvious (and 
uninteresting) is the equilibrium in which consumers purchase only products sold at the low-
quality price (here normalized to zero) and in which all producers produce only low quality. A 
more interesting equilibrium is one in which consumers favor single-product firms by buying 
from them with higher probability, even if the single product firm offers the good at the same 
price as the two-product firm. By doing so, consumers could negate the scale advantage of the 
two-product firm by purchasing, in aggregate, more of the single good from the single-product 
firm. For example, suppose goods A and B are similar in that the cost of producing high quality 
is equal, 𝑐𝐴 = 𝑐𝐵  , the probability that low quality is detected depends solely on the total number 
of low quality goods produced by that firm, 𝑘, 𝑠𝐴(𝑘) = 𝑠𝐵(𝑘) = 𝑠𝐴𝐵(𝑘 2⁄ ,
𝑘
2⁄ )𝐵
 and demand 
for the two products is the same. Under those assumptions, there would be an equilibrium in 
which each consumer purchased randomly from all firms, but in which the probability with 
which the consumer purchased from each single-good firm was twice the probability with which 
the consumer purchased from each two-good firm.  If consumers behaved in this fashion, each 
two-product firm would sell half as much of each good as each single-product firm. So the total 
sales (A and B combined) of the two-product firms would equal the sales of the single-product 
firm. So the quality-assuring price for both products would be the same for two-product and one-
product firms. While interesting, this equilibrium assumes implausible consumer behavior.  
 So far this paper has assumed that consumer demand is structured so that, no matter the 
price, there is always sufficient demand to support multiple competing firms. As Rasmusen 
(2016) points out, however, it is possible that consumers will prefer low quality to high quality at 
the quality-assuring price that could be offered by a single-product firm. The existence of multi-
product firms can, in some circumstances, solve this problem by lowering the quality-assuring 
price. In this way, umbrella branding (the use of a single trademark for several products 
produced by the same firm) makes high quality viable in situations where, if the same product 
were produced by a single-product firm, high quality would require a quality-assuring price that 
consumers were unwilling to pay. Note, contrary to Rasmusen, umbrella branding makes high 
quality viable even in the presence of perfect competition. 
 While this section focused on umbrella branding, the law firm size issue explored by 
Iacobucci (2012) is analytically identical. Instead of a manufacturer making two goods, he 
considers a law firm producing two kinds of legal services, where the two services are 
distinguished by the fact that each is produced by a different lawyer. Nevertheless, the model 
would be the same. For each lawyer, there is a probability that low quality will be detected. If 
consumers punish both lawyers in a firm if they detect low quality by one lawyer, then low 
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quality is likely to be punished more swiftly in a multi-member firm.  This enables the multi-
member firm to credibly offer high quality at a lower quality-assuring price than either lawyer 
could offer if she practiced alone. 
 6. Reputational Economics of Scale in a Finite Horizon Model 
 This section shows that reputational economies of scale exist also in a finite horizon 
model similar to that pioneered by Kreps and Wilson (1982) and Milgrom and Roberts (1982). In 
this model, there are two types of firms, good and bad.  Firms know their types, but consumers 
do not know firm types.  Good firms always produce high quality goods, even if doing so is not 
profitable, while bad firms are opportunistic and produce high quality only if it maximizes the 
present discounted value of their profits.  The literature sometimes calls good firms 
“commitment type” firms, while bad firms are “strategic type” firms. With probability 𝜃, a firm 
is good, and with probability 1 − 𝜃 a firm is bad. 0 < 𝜃 < 1.  Assume that high quality goods 
cost 𝑐 to produce, 0 < 𝑐 < 1, while low quality goods cost zero to produce.  Consumer are 
willing to pay 1 for high quality goods and zero for low quality goods.  If consumers are 
uncertain about the quality of goods, the price they are willing to pay is proportional to the 
probability that they think quality will be high.  So, if consumers think only good firms will 
produce high quality, and they cannot distinguish between good and bad firms, they are willing 
to pay 𝜃.  As in the main model, let 𝑠(𝑘) be the probability that consumers detect and punish low 
quality, where 𝑘 is the number of low quality units sold,  𝑠(𝑘) = 0 , lim
𝑞→∞
𝑠(𝑞) = 1, 𝑠′ > 0, and 
𝑠′′ < 0.   Note that these assumptions imply that if a firm produces any low-quality goods, then 
0 < 𝑠 < 1. There is only one firm.  For simplicity, it is assumed that the firm produces either all 
high quality or all low quality, so 𝑘 = 𝑞.6  The firm sets the price, and consumers decide whether 
or not to buy. The discount factor is 𝛿, 0 < 𝛿 < 1. Consumers know all parameters – 𝜃, 𝑐, 𝑠, and 
𝛿 – but consumers do not know what type a firm is.  For convenience, if the payoffs to high and 
low quality are the same, it is assumed that the bad firm produces high quality. 
 Consider first a one-period game. Obviously, the bad firm will produce low quality and 
the good firm will produce high quality. As a result, the price will be 𝜃.  
 Now consider the strategy of a bad firm in a two-period game. It will produce high 
quality if doing so maximizes the present discounted value of its profits. Assuming that 
consumers will believe it produces high quality in the first period (an assumption justified 
below), the bad firm will produce high quality if: 
                                                 
6 No proof of the irrationality of mixing high and low quality is provided for this model, but there 
is no reason to think the proof in Appendix B would not, with appropriate modifications, apply to this 
model as well.  As with the infinitely repeated model, the key is that the second derivative of 𝑠(𝑘) is 
negative.  This means that the marginal cost of low quality (detection) is decreasing in quantity.  Since the 
marginal benefit of low quality (cost savings) is constant with respect to quantity, if it is profitable to 
produce one unit of low quality, it is profitable to produce all low quality.  
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1 − 𝑐 + 𝛿𝜃 ≥ 1 + 𝛿(1 − 𝑠)𝜃     (13) 
The left side represents the bad firm’s profits if it produces high quality in the first period and it 
is believed to produce high quality. It gets 1 in the first period (the price consumers are willing to 
pay for high quality), and it pays c to produce it. Because it produced high quality in the first 
period, consumers are willing to purchase from it in the second period. Nevertheless, because 
consumers know that the bad firm will produce low quality in the second (last) period, and since 
they do not know whether the firm is low quality, the price in the last period is 𝜃, as in the one-
period game. Since it costs the bad firm nothing to produce low quality, its discounted profits in 
the second period are 𝛿𝜃.  If the bad firm produces low quality in the first period, it gets profits 
of 1 (the price of high quality minus the costs of production, which are zero). Low quality is 
detected with probability s, and consumers rationally do not purchase from bad firms in the last 
period, so the present-discounted second-period profits are 𝛿(1 − 𝑠)𝜃.  Rearranging the terms of 
expression (13), the bad firm produces high quality in the first period if 𝑐 ≤ 𝜃𝛿𝑠.  As in Kreps 
and Wilson’s model, under some parameters, it is equilibrium behavior for bad firms to mimic 
good firms in all periods other than the last period, and it is rational for consumers to believe that 
bad firms, under some parameters, produce high quality, except in the last period. 
 If this inequality is satisfied, then it is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium for a bad firm to 
produce high quality in the first period (and to sell goods for 1 in the first period) and for a bad 
firm to sell low quality in the last period (and for the bad firm (and good firm) to sell its goods 
for 𝜃 in the second period). In this equilibrium, consumers purchase goods for a price of 1 in the 
first period, and purchase goods for 𝜃 in the second period, unless a firm has been detected as 
having sold low quality in the first period, in which case consumers refuse to buy from the firm 
in the second period (or buy only at price zero). If consumers in the first period do not buy at the 
prices stated above, the firm does not sell in the second period. If firms sell at prices other than 
those stated above, consumers do not buy anything. Appropriate beliefs can be constructed to 
make these off-equilibrium-path behaviors rational. 
 Note the effect of 𝑠. As 𝑠 goes up, the inequality in (13) is more likely to be satisfied, 
because s appears only on the right side, and the right side decreases as s increases. That is, the 
inequality is satisfied for lower values of 𝜃 and 𝛿 and for higher values of 𝑐. Since 𝑠 is an 
increasing function of quantity, 𝑞, this means that consumers are more likely to trust large firms.  
Thus, as under the infinitely-repeated game model analyzed in prior sections, there are 
reputational economies of scale. Since, in this model, the sellers are assumed to have pricing 
power, the reputational advantage is not in offering lower prices, but rather that a bad firm is 
more likely to be trusted to produce high quality (and more likely to do so) over a wider range of 
parameters. The model could be easily modified to show a pricing advantage of the larger firm, 
because c can be thought of not as absolute cost, but rather as the ratio of cost to price. Thus, as s 
goes up, it is rational for a bad firm to produce high quality even at a lower price. So a larger 
firm will be able to underprice a smaller firm. That is, suppose consumers were willing to pay 
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price, 𝑝 ¸𝑐 < 𝑝 < 1, for high quality goods, then there are prices such that it would be an 
equilibrium for a larger bad firms to produce high quality for price 𝑝, but not for a smaller bad 
firm. 
 Note also that quantity manifests itself in (13) only through 𝑠, the probability that bad 
quality in at least one product will be detected. If, as in the standard model, bad quality was 
detected with certainty, 𝑠 = 1, and quantity would be irrelevant. There would be no reputational 
economies of scale. A firm producing one good per period would behave in the same way as a 
firm producing a million goods per period, and a small firm would be just as trustworthy as a 
large one. As with the infinite horizon model of reputation, the key to reputational economies of 
scale is the idea that poor quality is more likely to be detected and punished when quantity is 
high.  
 Now consider a three-period game. There are two cases to consider, where 𝑐 ≤ 𝜃𝛿𝑠, so 
the bad firm can be assumed to produce high quality in the second period if low quality is not 
detected in the first period, and where 𝑐 > 𝜃𝛿𝑠 so the bad firm can be assumed to produce low 
quality in the second period. Consider first the situation where 𝑐 ≤ 𝜃𝛿𝑠. An equilibrium in which 
the bad firm produces high quality in the first period is plausible if: 
1 − 𝑐 + 𝛿(1 − 𝑐) + 𝛿2𝜃 ≥ 1 + 𝛿(1 − 𝑠) + 𝛿2(1 − 𝑠)2𝜃     (14) 
The left side is the payoff if the bad firm produces high quality in the first and second 
periods and low quality in the third. The right-hand side is the payoff if the bad firm produces 
low quality in all periods. It is assumed (and justified below) that consumers expect the firm to 
produce high quality in the first and second period and low quality in the third. Note that the 
expression above is more likely to be satisfied when s is high, because s appears only in the 
right-hand side, and higher values of s always makes the right-hand side smaller, thus increasing 
the range of parameters for which the inequality holds. Thus, as in the two-period game, there 
are reputational economies of scale, and consumers are more likely to trust large firms. It is, of 
course, necessary to check that it is rational for the firm to produce high quality in the first 
period.  Solving (14) for 𝜃, dividing top and bottom 𝜕, and rearranging the numerator, expression 
(14) can be rewritten as: 
𝜃 ≥
𝑐 +
𝑐
 𝛿 − 𝑠
𝛿(1 − (1 − 𝑠)2)
     (15) 
It is relatively easy to show that this expression is satisfied whenever 𝑐 ≤ 𝜃𝛿𝑠, which is 
the assumption for this case. 𝑐 ≤ 𝜃𝛿𝑠 is equivalent to 𝜃 ≥
𝑐
𝛿𝑠
.  If 𝜃 ≥
𝑐
𝛿𝑠
, the numerator of 
expression (15) is always smaller than c and the denominator of expression (15) is always larger 
than 𝛿𝑠, so any 𝑐 ≤ 𝜃𝛿𝑠 satisfies (15).   Compare the numerator of the right-hand side (15) to the 
numerator of 
𝑐
𝛿𝑠
.  That is, compare 𝑐 +
𝑐
 𝛿
− 𝑠 to 𝑐.  The numerator of the former is always 
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smaller, because 
𝑐
 𝛿
− 𝑠 < 0 whenever 𝑐 ≤ 𝜃𝛿𝑠 , which is our assumption for this case together 
with the fact that 𝜃 is a proportion and so must be less than 1.  Similarly, compare the 
denominator of the right-hand side of (15) to the denominator of 
𝑐
𝛿𝑠
.  That is, compare 
𝛿(1 − (1 − 𝑠)2) to 𝛿𝑠. The former is always larger, because 0 < 𝑠 < 1, whenever any low 
quality is produced. Thus, a bad firm will provide high quality in the first (and second) period of 
the three-period game if it would be rational for it to produce high quality in the first period of 
the two-period game.  
 Under this equilibrium, it is rational for consumers to believe that the bad firm will 
produce high quality in the first and second periods (and thus for consumers to pay 1) and that 
the bad firm will produce low quality in the third period (and thus for the consumers to pay 𝜃), as 
long as the consumer refuses to pay these prices from any firm that has been detected as 
producing low quality in the past. Appropriate actions and beliefs off the equilibrium path can be 
easily constructed. 
 Now consider the three-period game where 𝑐 > 𝜃𝛿𝑠, that is, where the bad firm will 
produce low quality in the second and third periods. As in Kreps and Wilson’s (1982) model, it 
is possible that the bad firm will produce high quality in the first period, even though it will 
produce low quality in later periods. Such an equilibrium would be plausible if: 
1 − 𝑐 + 𝛿𝜃 +
𝛿2(1 − 𝑠)𝜃
 1 − s(1 − 𝜃)
≥ 1 + 𝛿(1 − 𝑠)𝜃 +
𝛿2(1 − 𝑠)2𝜃
 1 − s(1 − 𝜃)
 
(16) 
 
As before, the left side is the payoff if the bad firm produces high quality in the first 
period, but not in any other period, whereas the right side is the payoff if the bad firm produces 
low quality in all periods. The last term of each side of (16) is slightly different than (14) because 
one must take into account the Bayesian inferences that consumers can draw from the fact that 
low quality has not been detected in the first two periods.  It is assumed (and justified below) that 
consumers expect the firm to produce high quality in the first period and low quality in the 
second and third periods.  Let 
 𝑓(𝜃) = 𝜃 +
𝛿(1 − 𝑠)𝜃
 1 − s(1 − 𝜃)
 
Substituting the above into equation 16, we obtain the following: 
−𝑐 +  𝛿𝑓(𝜃) ≥  𝛿(1 − 𝑠)𝑓(𝜃) (17) 
−𝑐 ≥  −𝛿𝑠𝑓(𝜃)  
𝑐 <  𝛿𝑠𝑓(𝜃) (18) 
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When the firm shirks in the first period, it does not have to pay cost c, so -c captures the benefit to 
shirking (avoiding cost c). Against that benefit, shirking reduces the expected future payoffs by a 
factor s, which is the probability of detection. In other words, the cost-benefit of shirking is that 
there is a benefit of not paying c, but there is some probability of getting caught, and as a result, 
that benefit is not obtained in the second or third periods. This is tradeoff is represented by 
Equation 18, which indicates that there is a critical value of costs of cooperating given the 
following result: For T = 3, non-shirking can be sustained in the first period if and only if  
 𝑐 ≤  𝑐3
∗, (19) 
 
where 𝑐3
∗ = 𝛿𝑠𝑓(𝜃). 
We compare the above to the two-period game (T = 2) condition, 𝑐 < 𝛿𝑠𝜃. Let 
   
 
 𝑐2
∗ = 𝛿𝑠𝜃 (20) 
 
We need to demonstrate that the conditions under which T = 3 are less stringent, so we need to 
show that 𝑐3
∗ > 𝑐2
∗.  𝑐3
∗ > 𝑐2
∗ is equivalent to: 
 𝛿𝑠𝑓(𝜃) > 𝛿𝑠𝜃  
 (𝜃) +  
𝛿(1−𝑠) 𝜃
 1−𝑠(1−𝜃)
 > 𝜃 (21) 
 
 𝛿(1−𝑠) 𝜃
 1−𝑠(1−𝜃)
 > 0 (22) 
 
 
Since 𝑠, 𝜃, and 𝛿 are all between 0 and 1, equation 22 must be true and 𝑐3
∗ > 𝑐2
∗.  
As in the case where 𝑐 ≤ 𝜃𝛿𝑠, consumers are rational to believe that, when inequality 
(16) is satisfied, a bad firm will produce high quality in the first period and low quality in later 
periods.  Of course, if inequality (16) is violated, the bad firm will produce low quality in all 
periods and equilibrium prices will fall accordingly. 
Appendix C generalizes these results to games of any number of periods. 
 7. Caveat and Extension 
 The models in this paper are, like all models, unrealistic in some respects. A key way in 
which these models are unrealistic is that they assume that if the firm chooses to produce with 
high quality, no low quality goods are produced. That is unrealistic, because even the best quality 
19 
 
control cannot prevent production of an occasional defective product. Relaxing this assumption 
will reinforce the reputational advantage of larger firms, because consumers can more easily 
discern whether defects are endemic or idiosyncratic when the firm produces a large number of 
goods. For example, if a firm produces ten goods and one is of poor quality, consumers cannot 
infer with confidence that the firm has bad quality control, because it is possible that the one 
good of poor quality reflects simply bad luck from a firm that produces high quality goods with 
probability much higher than 90%. On the other hand, if a firm produces one million goods and 
one hundred thousand are defective, the consumer can very reliably infer that the firm has poor 
quality controls that result in a high (10%) rate of defects.7    
 An interesting extension of the analysis in this article is to certification marks.  
Certification marks are a type of trademark in which one entity uses its reputation to back the 
idea that products produced by others meet certain quality standards (Holtzman 1991). Examples 
include marks such as Underwriter’s Laboratory (for electrical safety) and the Union of 
Orthodox Rabbis (for kosher food). One puzzle is why certification is necessary. Why isn’t the 
reputation of the company producing the goods sufficient to ensure quality? One possibility is 
that certification is helpful when the probably that low quality will be detected is very low. In 
that situation, the reputation of a single firm, even a large one, may not be sufficient to bond 
good behavior. The theory of umbrella branding set out in Section V is helpful here. Just as a 
firm producing two goods may be in a better position to bond the reputation of its products, so a 
certifier who certifies hundreds of goods may be in a better position to bond the reputation of all 
those products. If consumers blame the certifier when one of the certified firms is detected as 
shirking, then the certifier has an incentive to closely monitor all the firms it certifies, and 
consumers will rationally trust certified products more than uncertified. In this way, the 
effectiveness of certification is an application of the idea of reputational economies of scale.  
When the probability of detection is very low, the quantity produced by a single firm may not be 
sufficient to ensure no shirking. Spreading the reputational umbrella of the certifier over the 
goods produced by multiple firms restores reputational incentives. This may explain why 
certification is especially prevalent for credence attributes, such as safety or kashrut, where even 
discerning consumers cannot tell whether the producer has shirked simply by consuming or 
experiencing the good (Dulleck, Kerschbamer and Sutter 2011).8  
 
 8. Conclusion 
 Relaxing the assumption that low quality is detected with certainty at the end of each 
period helps explain the widely assumed phenomenon of reputational economies of scale. Once 
this assumption is relaxed, reputational economies of scale emerge under the infinitely repeated 
                                                 
7 The author thanks Steve Shavell for making the point in this paragraph. 
8 The author thanks Megan Stevenson for encouraging him to include this paragraph, which, in 
fact, motivated the author’s interest in reputational economies of scale.  
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game model of reputation, even in competitive markets. Similarly, if the assumption that low 
quality is detected with certainty, reputational economies of scale also occur in a finite horizon 
game model of reputation with two types. Reputational economies of scale help explain many 
market phenomena, including gatekeeper liability, one-sided consumer contracts, umbrella 
branding, and the large size of firms in industries where product quality is hard to enforce 
through inspection or contract. 
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Appendix A. Proof of the Existence of Quality-Assuring Umbrella Prices  
Lemma 1. If firms producing both A and B choose prices and quantities that would be 
quality-assuring for firms producing just A or just B, then constraints C1, C2, and C3 would be 
satisfied with strict inequalities.  That is, if 𝑝𝐴
′∗ =
(𝑟+𝑠𝐴)𝑐𝐴
𝑠𝐴
  and 𝑝𝐵
′∗ =
(𝑟+𝑠𝐵)𝑐𝐵
𝑠𝐵
, then C1, C2 and 
C3 would hold with strict inequalities. 
 First consider C1. To Prove: 
𝑞𝐴𝑖(𝑝𝐴
′∗−𝑐𝐴)+𝑞𝐵𝑖(𝑝𝐵
′∗−𝑐𝐵)
𝑟
> 
𝑞𝐴𝑖𝑝𝐴
′∗+𝑞𝐵𝑖𝑝𝐵
′∗
(𝑟+𝑠𝐴𝐵)
 
Substitute 𝑝𝐴
′∗ =
(𝑟+𝑠𝐴)𝑐𝐴
𝑠𝐴
  and 𝑝𝐵
′∗ =
(𝑟+𝑠𝐵)𝑐𝐵
𝑠𝐵
 and simplify: 
𝑞𝐴𝑖(
(𝑟+𝑠𝐴)𝑐𝐴
𝑠𝐴
  −𝑐𝐴)+𝑞𝐵𝑖(
(𝑟+𝑠𝐵)𝑐𝐵
𝑠𝐵
−𝑐𝐵)
𝑟
> 
𝑞𝐴𝑖
(𝑟+𝑠𝐴)𝑐𝐴
𝑠𝐴
+𝑞𝐵𝑖
(𝑟+𝑠𝐵)𝑐𝐵
𝑠𝐵
(𝑟+𝑠𝐴𝐵)
  
𝑞𝐴𝑖𝑐𝐴
𝑠𝐴
+
𝑞𝐵𝑖𝑐𝐵
𝑠𝐵
>
𝑞𝐴𝑖𝑐𝐴
𝑠𝐴
( 
𝑟+𝑠𝐴
𝑟+𝑠𝐴𝐵
) +
𝑞𝐵𝑖𝑐𝐵
𝑠𝐵
(
𝑟+𝑠𝐵
𝑟+𝑠𝐴𝐵
)  
𝑠𝐴𝐵 > 𝑠𝐴 > 0 and 𝑠𝐴𝐵 > 𝑠𝐵 > 0 (see p. 10), so the above inequality always holds. 
 Next consider C2: To Prove: 
𝑞𝐴𝑖(𝑝𝐴
′∗−𝑐𝐴)+𝑞𝐵𝑖(𝑝𝐵
′∗−𝑐𝐵)
𝑟
> 
𝑞𝐴𝑖𝑝𝐴
′∗+𝑞𝐵𝑖(𝑝𝐵
′∗−𝑐𝐵)
(𝑟+𝑠𝐴)
 
As with C1, substitute 𝑝𝐴
′∗ =
(𝑟+𝑠𝐴)𝑐𝐴
𝑠𝐴
  and 𝑝𝐵
′∗ =
(𝑟+𝑠𝐵)𝑐𝐵
𝑠𝐵
 and simplify: 
𝑞𝐴𝑖𝑐𝐴
𝑠𝐴
+
𝑞𝐵𝑖𝑐𝐵
𝑠𝐵
>  
𝑞𝐴𝑖𝑐𝐴
𝑠𝐴
+
𝑞𝐵𝑖𝑐𝐵
𝑠𝐵
(
𝑟
𝑟 + 𝑠𝐴
) 
𝑟 > 0 and 𝑠𝐴 > 0, so the above inequality always holds. 
 Similar reasoning shows that C3 also holds with strict inequality. Q.E.D. 
 
Now consider the main proposition to be proved, that there exist prices, (𝑝𝐴
′∗, 𝑝𝐵
′∗), 
satisfying constraints C1 through C6. Consider ordered pairs, (𝑝𝐴, 𝑝𝐵) and, in particular the set 
of ordered pairs constituting the line segment between (𝑐𝐴,𝑐𝐵) and (
(𝑟+𝑠𝐴)𝑐𝐴
𝑠𝐴
,
(𝑟+𝑠𝐵)𝑐𝐵
𝑠𝐵
).  The first 
point is defined by the marginal cost of producing each good, and the second point is defined by 
the quality-assuring prices when a firm produces only good A or only good B.  Note that at 
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(𝑐𝐴,𝑐𝐵), C1, C2, and C3 will be each violated, because the left-hand sides will be zero and the 
right-hand sides will be positive.  Note also that, according to Lemma 1, at (
(𝑟+𝑠𝐴)𝑐𝐴
𝑠𝐴
,
(𝑟+𝑠𝐵)𝑐𝐵
𝑠𝐵
), 
C1, C2 and C3 each hold with strict inequalities. 
Now consider what happens to C1 as one moves along the line from (
(𝑟+𝑠𝐴)𝑐𝐴
𝑠𝐴
,
(𝑟+𝑠𝐵)𝑐𝐵
𝑠𝐵
) 
to (𝑐𝐴,𝑐𝐵) while setting the number of firms, n, such that C6 (zero profits) holds. For this 
purpose, it is helpful to rewrite C1 with total quantities rather than quantities per firm by 
multiplying the left and right-hand side of the inequality by the number of firms: 
𝑞𝐴(𝑝𝐴
′∗−𝑐𝐴)+𝑞𝐵(𝑝𝐵
′∗−𝑐𝐵)
𝑟
≥ 
𝑞𝐴𝑝𝐴
′∗+𝑞𝐵𝑝𝐵
′∗
(𝑟+𝑠𝐴𝐵)
 (A1) 
For each set of prices on the line segment between (𝑐𝐴,𝑐𝐵) and (
(𝑟+𝑠𝐴)𝑐𝐴
𝑠𝐴
,
(𝑟+𝑠𝐵)𝑐𝐵
𝑠𝐵
), we can find a 
number of firms, 𝑛, such that C6 (zero profits) holds because of continuity.  The right-hand side 
of C6 is a continuous function of n, because the right-hand side of C6 is just the left-hand side of 
(A1) divided by n.  We have assumed that total demand for A and B is sufficiently large to 
support competing firms, so there is some value of 𝑛 ≥ 2 for which the right-hand side of C6 at 
equals or exceeds the left-hand side.  We also know that as n goes to infinity, the value of the 
right-hand side of C6 goes to zero.  So there must be some value of n for which the equality in 
C6 is true.  
Note that since total demand for A and total demand for B, 𝑞𝐴 and 𝑞𝐵, are assumed to be 
continuous functions of the prices, (𝑝𝐴, 𝑝𝐵), and since 𝑠𝐴𝐵 is strictly positive and a continuous 
function of 𝑞𝐴 and 𝑞𝐵, which in turn are continuous functions of (𝑝𝐴, 𝑝𝐵), then both sides of the 
inequality (A1) must also be continuous functions of prices.   
Since the inequality in (A1) holds strictly at (
(𝑟+𝑠𝐴)𝑐𝐴
𝑠𝐴
,
(𝑟+𝑠𝐵)𝑐𝐵
𝑠𝐵
) and is violated at 
(𝑐𝐴,𝑐𝐵), and since the both sides vary continuously with 𝑝𝐴 and 𝑝𝐵, there must be a place on the 
line between those two points where the left-hand and right-hand sides are equal.  If there is only 
one such point, call that point (𝑥1, 𝑦1). If there is more than one such point, denote as (𝑥1, 𝑦1) the 
one with the highest value of 𝑝𝐴.  Note that, for all points on the line between (𝑥1, 𝑦1) and 
(
(𝑟+𝑠𝐴)𝑐𝐴
𝑠𝐴
,
(𝑟+𝑠𝐵)𝑐𝐵
𝑠𝐵
), C1 holds with strict inequality, because if it held with equality that would 
violate the definition of (𝑥1, 𝑦1),  and if the inequality did not hold at all, then, because of 
continuity, there would have to be another point in that interval where C1 held with equality, 
which would also violate the definition of (𝑥1, 𝑦1). 
 Now consider what happens to C2 as one moves along the line from (
(𝑟+𝑠𝐴)𝑐𝐴
𝑠𝐴
,
(𝑟+𝑠𝐵)𝑐𝐵
𝑠𝐵
) 
to (𝑐𝐴,𝑐𝐵) while also assuming that C6 (zero profits) holds. Following reasoning similar to that in 
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the prior paragraph, there will be one or more points on the line segment between (𝑐𝐴,𝑐𝐵) and 
(
(𝑟+𝑠𝐴)𝑐𝐴
𝑠𝐴
,
(𝑟+𝑠𝐵)𝑐𝐵
𝑠𝐵
) where C2 holds with equality.  If there is only one such point, call that point 
(𝑥2, 𝑦2). If there is more than one such point, denote as (𝑥2, 𝑦2) the one with the highest value of 
𝑝𝐴.  For every point on the line between (𝑥2, 𝑦2) and (
(𝑟+𝑠𝐴)𝑐𝐴
𝑠𝐴
,
(𝑟+𝑠𝐵)𝑐𝐵
𝑠𝐵
), C2 holds with strict 
inequality. 
 By similar reasoning, let (𝑥3, 𝑦3) be the sole point where C3 holds with equality on the 
line segment between (𝑐𝐴,𝑐𝐵) and (
(𝑟+𝑠𝐴)𝑐𝐴
𝑠𝐴
,
(𝑟+𝑠𝐵)𝑐𝐵
𝑠𝐵
) or the one with the highest value of 𝑝𝐴. C3 
will hold with strict inequality for every point (𝑥3, 𝑦3) and (
(𝑟+𝑠𝐴)𝑐𝐴
𝑠𝐴
,
(𝑟+𝑠𝐵)𝑐𝐵
𝑠𝐵
). 
 Let (𝑝𝐴
′∗, 𝑝𝐵
′∗) = {
(𝑥1, 𝑦1) if 𝑥1 ≥ 𝑥2 and 𝑥1 ≥ 𝑥3
(𝑥2, 𝑦2) if 𝑥2 > 𝑥1 and 𝑥2 ≥ 𝑥3
(𝑥3, 𝑦3) if 𝑥3 > 𝑥1 and 𝑥3 > 𝑥2
  
By construction, all 6 constraints – C1 through C6 -- are satisfied at these prices, so there 
exists at least one pair of quality-assuring prices consistent with competition in which the two-
good firms have prices lower than the one-good firms. Q.E.D. 
Note that there are an infinite number of ordered pairs (𝑝𝐴
′∗, 𝑝𝐵
′∗), satisfying constraints C1 
through C6.  Their existence can be proved by considering the family of curves (e.g. increasingly 
concave or convex bowed-out lines) passing through  (𝑐𝐴,𝑐𝐵) and (
(𝑟+𝑠𝐴)𝑐𝐴
𝑠𝐴
,
(𝑟+𝑠𝐵)𝑐𝐵
𝑠𝐵
), but 
overlapping or intersecting the straight line between those points only at the endpoints.  By 
reasoning similar to the above for straight lines, each of those curves will also have a point where 
all six constraints are satisfied, and that point will not be on the straight line.  For the purposes of 
this paper, it is sufficient to prove that there is just one such ordered pairs.  Consideration of 
additional pairs satisfying the constraints introduces complications, such as how consumers 
coordinate on one pair of prices.  By just considering the pair whose existence was proved first, 
such complications can be avoided. 
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Appendix B. No Mixing of High and Low Quality 
The main text (and other articles in the literature) assume that a manufacturer that 
produces a single good produces either all high quality or all low quality of that good.  Similarly, 
it is generally assumed that a manufacturer who produces two goods, A and B, produces uniform 
quality of A and uniform quality of B.  That is, the text and literature assume that, although a 
firm may produce high quality A and low quality B, or low quality A and high quality B, the 
firm does not produce some high quality A and some low quality A and/or some high quality B 
and some low quality B.  Given the assumption of fixed costs, F, that assumption may be 
reasonable.  Perhaps producing some high and some low quality would require duplication of the 
fixed costs (or at least additional fixed costs).  On the other hand, given the assumption that the 
marginal cost, c, is constant, no matter how many units are produced, it is also reasonable to 
consider the possibility that the manufacturer would choose to produce some high and some low-
quality goods.   
 First consider the umbrella branding case, where there are two goods. To show that 
mixing is not rational, one must prove the following inequality: 
𝑞𝐴𝑖(𝑝𝐴
′∗−𝑐𝐴)+𝑞𝐵𝑖(𝑝𝐵
′∗−𝑐𝐵)
𝑟
≥
(𝑞𝐴𝑖−𝑘𝐴𝑖)(𝑝𝐴
′∗−𝑐𝐴)+𝑘𝐴𝑖𝑝𝐴
′∗+(𝑞𝐵𝑖−𝑘𝐵)(𝑝𝐵
′∗−𝑐𝐵)+𝑘𝐵𝑖𝑝𝐵
′∗
𝑟+𝑠𝐴𝐵(𝑘𝐴𝑖 ,𝑘𝐵𝑖)
 (A2) 
Note that if 𝑘𝐴𝑖 = 𝑘𝐵𝑖 = 0 that the left and right sides of the above expression would be equal.  
Note also that, given conditions C1, C2, and C3, if 𝑘𝐴𝑖 = 𝑞𝐴𝑖 and/or 𝑘𝐵𝑖 = 𝑞𝐵𝑖 , the left and right 
sides of the above expression are either equal or the right side is smaller.  The inequality can be 
rewritten as: 
0 ≥ 𝑟(𝑘𝐴𝑖 + 𝑐𝐴 + 𝑘𝐵𝑐𝐵) − 𝑠𝐴𝐵(𝑘𝐴𝑖 , 𝑘𝐵𝑖) [𝑞𝐴𝑖(𝑝𝐴
′∗ − 𝑐𝐴) + 𝑞𝐵𝑖(𝑝𝐵
′∗ − 𝑐𝐵)] (𝐴3) 
Like A2, the right and left sides of A3 are equal when 𝑘𝐴𝑖 = 𝑘𝐵𝑖 = 0. Similarly, if 𝑘𝐴𝑖 = 𝑞𝐴𝑖 
and/or 𝑘𝐵𝑖 = 𝑞𝐵𝑖, the left and right sides of the above expression are either equal or the right side 
is smaller.  As a result, it is sufficient to prove that the second partial second-derivatives of the 
right-hand side with respect to 𝑘𝐴𝑖 and 𝑘𝐵𝑖 are positive. Since the expressions are identical with 
respect to 𝑘𝐴𝑖 and 𝑘𝐵𝑖, it sufficient to prove the second derivative with respect to 𝑘𝐴𝑖 is positive.  
The second derivative with respect to 𝑘𝐴𝑖 is: 
−
𝑑2𝑠𝐴𝐵
𝑑2𝑘𝐴𝑖
[𝑞
𝐴𝑖
(𝑝𝐴
′∗ − 𝑐𝐴) + 𝑞𝐵𝑖(𝑝𝐵
′∗ − 𝑐𝐵)] 
Since the first term (the second derivative of 𝑠𝐴𝐵) is negative, and the second term (in square 
brackets) is positive, the negative of the product of the two terms is positive.  Q.E.D. 
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 The one good case, where the manufacturer produces only one good, follows easily from 
the proof above. To prove that a firm would not produce some high and some low quality, just 
remove any terms with B subscripts and then remove all the A and AB subscripts.  The proof then 
follows in exactly the same way.   
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Appendix C. Proof of Reputational Economies of Scale for Any Number of Periods in the Finite 
Horizon Game 
In order to generalize from the three-period model to multiple periods, for any arbitrary t = 0, …, 
T, the payoff to complying in the first period is: 
   
 
1 − 𝑐 +  ∑ 𝛿𝑡(1 − 𝑠)𝑡−1𝑝𝑡(𝜃) ,
𝑇
𝑡=1
 
(A4) 
 
 
where 𝑝𝑡
∗(𝜃) = 𝑝(𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑑 𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒 | 𝑅𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑 𝑡) according to Bayes’ Rule. Similarly, the payoff to 
shirking in the first period is:  
 
 
Let 𝑐𝑇
∗  be the critical value of 𝑐 such that if 𝑐 ≤  𝑐𝑇
∗ , there will be cooperation in the game of 𝑇 
periods. Then  
  
where 𝑓𝑇(𝜃) = ∑ 𝛿
𝑡(1 − 𝑠)𝑡−1𝑝𝑡(𝜃).
𝑇
𝑡=1  
Our goal is to show that the conditions for non-shirking are less stringent in a game of 𝑇  rounds 
than in one of 𝑇 − 1 rounds, and thus that cooperation not only is possible in games with more 
periods but that cooperation becomes more likely, at least in the early periods, when the game 
has many periods. To do that, we must show that 𝑐𝑇
∗ > 𝑐𝑇−1
∗ . To show this, note that by equation 
A7: 
 
 
1 +  ∑ 𝛿𝑡(1 − 𝑠)𝑡𝑝𝑡(𝜃)
𝑇
𝑡=1
 
    
(A5) 
 
=  1 + (1 − 𝑠) ∑ 𝛿𝑡(1 − 𝑠)𝑡−1𝑝𝑡(𝜃)
𝑇
𝑡=1
 
    
(A6) 
   
   
  𝑐𝑇
∗ =  𝛿𝑠𝑓𝑇(𝜃) (A7) 
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 𝑐𝑇
∗ − 𝑐𝑇−1
∗ =  𝛿𝑠 [𝑓𝑇(𝜃) −  𝑓𝑇−1(𝜃)] (A8) 
 
 
 
 
=  𝛿𝑠 [∑ 𝛿𝑡−1(1 − 𝑠)𝑡−1𝑝𝑡
𝑇
𝑡=1
(𝜃) − ∑ 𝛿𝑡−1(1 − 𝑠)𝑡−1𝑝𝑡
𝑇−1
𝑡=1
(𝜃)] 
 
 
(A9) 
 
 
 =  𝛿𝑠 [𝛿𝑇−1(1 − 𝑠)(1 − 𝑠)𝑇−1𝑝𝑇(𝜃)] (A10) 
 
This implies that  𝑐𝑇
∗  >  𝑐𝑇−1
∗  if 
 𝛿𝑇−1(1 − 𝑠)𝑇−1𝑝𝑇(𝜃)  > 0 
 
(A11) 
A11 is always true, because 𝛿 ∈ (0, 1), 𝑠 ∈ (0, 1), and 𝑝𝑇 ∈ (0, 1). 
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